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A fundamental challenge for cognitive neuroscience is characterizing how the primitives
of psychological theory are neurally implemented. Attempts to meet this challenge are
a manifestation of what Fechner called “inner” psychophysics: the theory of the precise
mapping between mental quantities and the brain. In his own time, inner psychophysics
remained an unrealized ambition for Fechner. We suggest that, today, multivariate
pattern analysis (MVPA), or neural “decoding,” methods provide a promising starting
point for developing an inner psychophysics. A cornerstone of these methods are
simple linear classifiers applied to neural activity in high-dimensional activation spaces.
We describe an approach to inner psychophysics based on the shared architecture
of linear classifiers and observers under decision boundary models such as signal
detection theory. Under this approach, distance from a decision boundary through
activation space, as estimated by linear classifiers, can be used to predict reaction time
in accordance with signal detection theory, and distance-to-bound models of reaction
time. Our “neural distance-to-bound” approach is potentially quite general, and simple
to implement. Furthermore, our recent work on visual object recognition suggests it is
empirically viable. We believe the approach constitutes an important step along the path
to an inner psychophysics that links mind, brain, and behavior.
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1. MAPPING A ROUTE FROM MIND TO BRAIN: THE DREAM OF
AN INNER PSYCHOPHYSICS
A fundamental challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to explain how the primitives of
psychological theory are neurally implemented (Davis and Poldrack, 2013). Theories and models
aimed at meeting this challenge are the modern manifestation of what Fechner (1860/1966) called
“inner” psychophysics: the theory of the precise mapping between mental quantities and the brain.
In Fechner’s own time, inner psychophysics remained a dream (Scheerer, 1992). Even today,
concrete proposals remain elusive. Indeed, many have wondered whether cognitive neuroscience is
even up to the challenge (Price and Friston, 2005; Coltheart, 2006; Feldman Barrett, 2009; Poldrack,
2010). We side with those who have argued, more optimistically, that the field requires a shift in
thinking for progress to continue (de Wit et al., 2016).
Ritchie and Carlson Decoding and Inner Psychophysics
The key to inner psychophysics, we believe, is using
psychological models, applied to neural activity, to predict
behavior (Werner and Mountcastle, 1963; Britten et al.,
1992). Consider the traditional motivation for using behavioral
measures in (“outer”) psychophysics. Since the mind cannot
be measured directly, Fechner and others reasoned that
behavior can serve as a proxy to estimate stimulus-driven
variation in mental quantities and processes. Similar reasoning
supports behavioral measures as the key to developing “linking”
hypotheses from psychological theory to the brain (Brindley,
1960; Teller, 1984). If a neural component implements a
primitive identified by some theory or model, then we
should be able to predict behavioral variation from its
functional organization (Forstmann et al., 2011). We focus on
representational linking hypotheses: how are the representations
posited by psychological theory implemented by the brain in a
manner that predicts behavior?
We propose that multi-variate pattern analysis (MVPA), or
neural “decoding,” methods provide one starting point for the
development of an inner psychophysics, and representational
linking hypotheses. These methods have allowed researchers to
investigate the information latent in neural activity patterns,
and uncover the structure and content of the brain’s population
code (Kriegeskorte and Kievit, 2013; Haxby et al., 2014; Haynes,
2015). A cornerstone of these methods are linear classifiers
applied to high-dimensional neural activation spaces. Here
we present a simple approach for developing representational
linking hypotheses based on the shared architecture of linear
classifiers and observers under decision boundary models such as
signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966). We also review
our work on visual object categorization that lends empirical
support to the approach (Carlson et al., 2014; Ritchie et al.,
2015), and connect the approach to research on the neural loci
of decision-making (Gold and Shadlen, 2007).




The suitability of MVPA methods for investigating neural
representation, and developing representational linking
hypotheses, can be motivated in part by their biological and
(potential) psychological plausibility.
A common assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that
the brain utilizes “population codes”: internal representations
are implemented in distributed patterns of neural activity—
incidentally, an idea somewhat anticipated by Fechner’s
(1882/1987) discussion of memory. If the brain uses population
codes it may face a multivariate classification problem when
differentiating these neural patterns. If this differentiation is
achieved by a linear combinations of inputs, then we should
be able to decode the contents of the encoding patterns of
activity using classifiers that mirror the linear operations the
brain employs. In decoding analyses, activation spaces are
reconstructed from patterns of neural activity, and a linear
classifier is trained to discriminate between the patterns for
different experimental conditions. If the classifier performs
significantly above chance, then minimally it can be inferred
that information about the conditions is latent, and accessible,
from the patterns of neural activity (Kriegeskorte and Bandettini,
2007). The biological plausibility of the linear classifiers also
suggests that the information may be explicitly represented by
the patterns.
While MVPA offers one starting point for developing an inner
psychophysics, the biological plausibility of linear classifiers does
not alone establish a connection between activation spaces and
observer psychology. As de Wit et al. (2016) emphasize, that
a classifier can learn to discriminate patterns of neural activity
shows that information is latent, and perhaps represented, but
not necessarily how it is being used, or is usable, by the
observer (Cox and Savoy, 2003; Williams et al., 2007). In other
words, the biological plausibility of linear classifiers is not
enough to show that they are psychologically plausible, which
also requires linking a psychological theory to an activation
space. Fortunately, there is a long tradition in psychology
of modeling the structure of psychological spaces to predict
behavior (Attneave, 1950; Shepard, 1964; for a more recent
perspective, see: Gärdenfors, 2000). All quantitative models
of categorization within this tradition hold that tokens of a
representation occupy different points in a space, and how these
points are positioned in the space, based on some similarity
or distance function, drives mental processes and behavior
(Ashby and Maddox, 1993). For example, in prototype models
(e.g., Posner and Keele, 1968) discriminability of a stimulus is
determined by the distance of a representation to the central
tendency of a category distribution in the space, and in exemplar
models (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) discriminability is determined
by the relative similarity of the representation to all other
exemplar representations in the space. The high-dimensional
activation spaces reconstructed using MVPA may conform to
similar principles of organization identified in these quantitative
models of psychological space (Op de Beeck et al., 2008; Davis
and Poldrack, 2013; Kriegeskorte and Kievit, 2013; Haxby et al.,
2014). In which case, representational linking hypotheses can be
developed by applying principles from models of psychological
space to activation spaces.
One straightforward approach is to directly compare the
structure of a psychological space to an activation space.
Several studies using fMRI (Edelman et al., 1998; Mur et al.,
2013; Charest et al., 2014; Sha et al., 2015; Bracci and
Op de Beeck, 2016), cellular recordings (Op de Beeck et al.,
2001) and MEG (Wardle et al., 2016), have constructed
psychological spaces for stimuli from judgments of visual
similarity, and compared them to activation spaces constructed
using methods such as representational similarity analysis (RSA),
which estimates the pair-wise (dis)similarity between patterns
of neural activity for different conditions (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2008a). A robust correlation between the two spaces suggests
the activation spaces might implement the representations
that are driving the similarity judgments. This similarity-based
approach reflects the psychological plausibility of methods
like RSA. Although seldom noticed in cognitive neuroscience,
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linear classifiers are also psychologically plausible, as we will
illustrate.
3. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: A
PSYCHOLOGICALLY PLAUSIBLE NEURAL
DISTANCE-TO-BOUND APPROACH
As used in MVPA, linear classifiers specify a decision boundary
through an activation space in order to discriminate between
neural patterns produced by different experimental conditions.
In general form this decision process is equivalent to that of the
human observer as posited by (linear) decision boundary models
of categorization for multivariate stimuli (Ashby and Gott, 1988;
Ashby andMaddox, 1990). To illustrate the close correspondence
of decoding methods with these models, consider that Naïve
Bayes classifiers, applied after linear discriminate analysis (LDA),
and observers under signal detection theory (SDT) share a
common organization. More specifically, they make the same
assumptions concerning: (i) distributions of evidence/data, and
(ii) the evaluation of evidence/data by the classifier/observer.
At an abstract level, SDT specifies a number of primitives
that mediate the relationship between stimulus and behavior
(Figure 1A). Consider a simple task in which an observer must
discriminate and map two stimuli (stim1, stim2) to two responses
(resp1, resp2). The input produced by a stimulus is characterized
as a sample from one of two distributions (fstim1 , fstim2) along
an evidence dimension, e.g., brightness, with response choice
resulting solely from a rule applied to a decision variable
(assuming equal stimulus probabilities and outcome utilities).
Traditionally, the decision variable was the value of the log-
likelihood ratio of the evidence, given the available hypotheses
(i.e., the logarithm of the ratio of the height of fstim1 and fstim2
at a point on the evidence dimension). Assuming no response
bias, the decision rule states that the observer selects the response
with greater value in the ratio, resulting in a decision boundary
along the evidence dimension. Under the usual distributional
assumptions of normalcy and equal variance, the measure of
observer sensitivity generated by the model, d’, is the difference
(or distance) between the means of fstim1 and fstim2 (it is also
closely related to Fechner’s own measure of sensitivity; Link,
1994). Architecturally, this model requires an internal stimulus
representation along with a decision process that determines
choice behavior given the information made explicit by the
representation.
LDA is a technique for transforming a space to maximize
between class variance (Duda et al., 2001). In the simplest case,
a 2D-space is replaced with a single discriminant axis onto
which each data point is projected. Importantly, it is assumed
that the distributions for the classes along each dimension (or
“feature”) are normal and of equal variance. If we further assume
the dimensions are independent, then we have a Naïve Bayes
classifier, which guesses based on the summed ratios of the
posterior probabilities for each class along each dimension. If
we take the logarithm of the ratio, and assume equal prior
probabilities, then the classifier uses a decision rule applied to
the log-likelihood ratio (Pereira et al., 2009). When a 2D space
is projected to a single discriminant axis, the architectures of
FIGURE 1 | (A) The model of the observer from signal detection theory (SDT) maps to (B) the distributions of patterns of neural activity as reconstructed using neural
decoding. (C) From this connection it is predicted that RT will negatively correlate with distance from a decision boundary through activation space. (D) The model of
the observer from SDT, and the distributed patterns of neural activity, can also be linked to the evidence accumulation process. (E) Thus another prediction from the
hypothesis is that distances from a decision boundary in activation space reflects the mean accumulation rate, and hence RT should correlate with accumulation rates
determined by representational distance.
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the classifier and the SDT observer are identical. In the multi-
dimensional case, the classifier is akin to the decision boundary
observer under the multi-dimensional generalization of SDT,
when dimensions are independent (Ashby and Townsend, 1986).
An initial implication of this equivalence is that one may
be able, in principle, to achieve close correspondence between
classifier and observer performance. For example, consider the
results of Philiastides and Sajda (2006) who observed similar
psychometric and “neurometric” functions for human and
classifier performance, when using an LDA classifier applied
to EEG data. Not only do their results take on a new
theoretical significance in light of the above equivalence, but
methodologically their application of a sensitivity measure to
classifier performance seems even more appropriate since the
measure presupposes the very architecture that the classifier
possesses (Tanner, 1956).
A further implication of the equivalence relates to reaction
time (RT) and the speed of transforming representations of a
stimulus into a decision. A simple feature of perceptual decision-
making, as first characterized by SDT, is that the quality of
evidence for an observer varies in its uncertainty (Tanner and
Swets, 1954). In particular, evidence close to the observers
decision boundary, or criterion, is more ambiguous, reflecting
the greater likelihood of the evidence under the alternative
hypotheses. In contrast, evidence far from the boundary is less
ambiguous, reflecting greater likelihood of the evidence under
one of the hypotheses about the source of the stimulus. Thus,
relative to some decision boundary, evidence quality tends to vary
with distance. RT also tends to vary with the quality of evidence:
lower quality evidence results in longer decision times compared
to high-quality evidence. A simple consequence of this familiar
picture from decision boundary models (e.g., SDT), as developed
with distance-to-bound models of choice and RT, is that distance
from a decision boundary will negatively correlate with RT (Pike,
1973; Ashby and Maddox, 1994).
LDA classifiers learn to discriminate between activity patterns
by positioning a decision boundary along a discriminant axis.
If an activation space provides the evidence being utilized by
an observer (Figure 1B), then one possibility is that distance
from a classifier boundary will predict RT (Figure 1C). Such
a result would suggest that an activation space implements an
explicit representation of stimulus information that is used by the
observer in a psychologically plausible manner. When decision
boundary models like SDT were first developed, it was presumed
that the evidence utilized by an observer was some unknown state
of neural activity (Swets et al., 1961; Werner and Mountcastle,
1963). The neural distance-to-bound approach we have described
provides a means of making good on this presumption. The
approach is potentially quite general and is simple to implement
as it relies on familiar MVPA and behavioral methods. We have
also conducted experiments to test the approach.
3.1. Neural Distance-to-Bound Predicts
Reaction Time for Object Categorization
Two of our recent experiments on visual object categorization
provide tangible evidence in support of neural distance-to-bound
as a viable approach to inner psychophysics (Carlson et al.,
2014; Ritchie et al., 2015). In both experiments, subjects were
tasked with judging as quickly and accurately as possible whether
object exemplars were animate or inanimate (i.e., “capable of self-
movement”). RT for the task was then related to activation spaces
reconstructed using fMRI and MEG decoding. Our prediction
was that RT would negatively correlate with representational
distances from a decision boundary computed using LDA
(Figure 1C).
Inferior temporal cortex (IT) has been strongly implicated
in object categorization in humans and primates (Logothetis
and Sheinberg, 1996), and information about object categories—
in particular, animacy—is highly decodable from this region
using fMRI (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008b; Connolly et al., 2012;
Konkle and Caramazza, 2013). In our first experiment we asked
whether the animacy information latent in activity patterns in
this region might be utilized when subjects performed an object
categorization task (Carlson et al., 2014). Using the fMRI data
of Kriegeskorte et al. (2008b), we computed the representational
distances of activity patterns for 92 object exemplars (faces
and bodies of humans and animals, as well as natural objects
and human artifacts) from a decision boundary for animacy in
IT. We then correlated these distances with the mean RT of
separate subjects performing the animacy task. Despite using
neural and behavioral data from completely different subjects,
we observed a significant negative correlation between RT and
the representational distances (Figure 2A). This result suggests
that animacy information in activity patterns in the region
may also be used by the observers performing the animacy
task.
While typically utilized with fMRI, MVPA is also increasingly
being employedwith EEG/MEG (King andDehaene, 2014). It has
been shown that significant decoding for object categories, and in
particular animacy, occurs as early as 60 ms post-stimulus onset,
with peak classifier performance occurring at greater latencies
for more abstract categories (Carlson et al., 2013; Cichy et al.,
2014). In our second experiment we sought to determine when
in time we might observe a negative correlation between RT and
distance-to-bound (Ritchie et al., 2015). Peak decoding reflects
the time at which information about stimulus categories is most
discriminable in the brain, thus we predicted representational
distance would negatively correlate with RTs during the period
of peak decoding. We estimated the representational distances
at each 20 ms time-point -100–600 ms post-stimulus onset for
24 object exemplars (same subordinate groupings as in our
previous experiment). While in the MEG, subjects performed the
animacy task, and their median RTs were correlated with the
representational distances at each time point. This allowed us
to see when in time there was a significant correlation between
representational distance and RT. As predicted, we observed a
significant correlation during the period of peak decoding, as
well as at later time points (Figure 2B). More generally we found
that the relationship between representational distance and RT
followed the time-course of decoding.
Taken together, these two results provide compelling evidence
in support of the viability of the neural distance-to-bound
approach.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) A 2D activation space for animacy in human IT. Distances from a decision boundary for animacy in human IT negatively correlate with RT as predicted
from the neural distance-to-bound approach. When distance is transformed into a drift rate parameter, RT and evidence accumulation time positively correlate
(modified from Carlson et al., 2014; © 2014 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). (B) Emergent activation spaces for animacy as reconstructed using MEG.
Distances from decision boundaries at peak decoding (gray area) negatively correlate with RT (modified from Ritchie et al., 2015). Interestingly, for both results the
correlations are primarily driven by the animate exemplar stimuli (for discussion, see Carlson et al., 2014).
3.2. Distance-to-Bound and the Neural
Basis of Decision-Making
The neural distance-to-bound approach has two important
implications for research on the neural basis of decision-
making. First, it has been suggested, in part based on
decoding methodology, that the line between representing and
deciding in the brain is blurred (DiCarlo and Cox, 2007). Our
approach provides theoretical and empirical support for this
perspective. If an observer’s decision boundary extends through
an activation space, then at least in some circumstances stimulus
representations and decision variables may be implemented in
the same neural component (Carlson et al., 2014). This contrasts
with perspectives according to which stimulus representations
and decision variables are generally associated with distinct brain
regions (Schall, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2004; Shadlen et al., 2007;
Filimon et al., 2013).
Second, evidence accumulation models of choice and RT are
a popular means of investigating the neural underpinnings of
decision-making (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Gold and Shadlen,
2007; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). While there are several versions
of these models to choose from Ratcliff and Smith (2004) they
all share certain features: evidence is sampled from a random
variable; at each iteration of the model, the evidence is used
to update a decision variable; and when the decision variable
reaches a stopping value, or threshold, the observer makes
a decision. Typically, choice and RT effects are modeled as
resulting from differences in accumulation rate of the decision
variable between experimental conditions.
Distance-to-bound and evidence accumulation models of RT
have sometimes been contrasted with each other (Pike, 1973;
Thomas, 2006). However, this opposition is not obligatory,
since distance-to-bound can be related to accumulation rate
(Ratcliff, 1985; Ashby, 2000). We assume the simplest RT-
distance relationship possible: a monotonic decrease in RT
correlating with a monotonic increase in distance. So neural
distance-to-bound can also be thought of as an approach
for characterizing the distance between the accumulate rate
distributions (Figures 1D–E), for any evidence accumulation
model that assumes amonotonic decrease in RTs as accumulation
rate increases. Thus, neural distance-to-bound also provides a
method for connecting neural decoding and neural evidence
accumulation approaches.
To illustrate the connection, we used distances from the
animacy boundary in human IT to simulate accumulation
rates for the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT; Wald,
1945), which has been used to relate spike rates to evidence
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accumulation (Gold and Shadlen, 2002). SPRT is a dynamic
extension of classic SDT: the observer selects a response based
on the log-likelihood ratio, but if the value of the ratio has
not yet reached threshold, the observer receives another unit
of evidence. The decision variable is the running tally of the
ratio, which accumulates until the threshold is reached. In our
study, we simulated SPRT using the representational distances
in human IT for each individual exemplar, transforming the
distances into accumulation rates (Figure 2A; Carlson et al.,
2014).
4. THE PATH TO AN INNER
PSYCHOPHYSICS: STILL A LONG WAY
TO GO
We believe neural distance-to-bound has considerable potential
as an (easy to apply) approach for developing representational
linking hypotheses. Still, we stress that it is just one possible
approach for furthering the study of inner psychophysics. In
some domains of perception and cognition, it might not be viable
at all. For example, it is unclear how well it will fair in a domain
like neurolinguistics, where there is considerable difficulty in
linking the primitives of linguistic theory to the brain (Poeppel,
2012). Furthermore, other approaches that may be superior at
modeling RT, such as exemplar models (Nosofsky and Stanton,
2005), could provide a better connection between activation
spaces and evidence accumulation.
More fundamentally, failure to observe a negative RT-distance
correlation does not necessarily entail that the information
in neural activity is unused. Instead, we might have the
wrong model for how it is used. For instance, crucially
our approach assumes linear separability, as using nonlinear
classifiers for decoding is typically discouraged on the grounds
that they are overpowered and lack biological plausibility
(Kamitani and Tong, 2005; DiCarlo and Cox, 2007). However,
many quantitative models of categorization do not share this
assumption. For example, exemplar models have often been
tested using stimulus sets that do not allow for linear separation
in perceptual space (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). Thus, the existence
of psychologically plausible nonlinear categorization models
may warrant revisiting the use of nonlinear classifiers in
MVPA.
The ultimate import of our approach, then, is that it
suggests more sophisticated representational linking hypotheses
are possible. Recognizing this possibility is an important step
along the path to an inner psychophysics, and the realization of
Fechner’s dream.
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